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Harold Marsh Sewall, the “ truculent'* consul general at Apia, Samoa, was a member 
of Maine’s premier shipbuilding and shipping family. As such, he understood the 
connection between a strong American presence in the Pacific and the health of the 
nation's shipping and commerce. His vigorous pursuit of American interests in 
Samoa, however, cost him his position at the end of the Cleveland administration.
Maine Mini time Museum photo courtesy of the author.
HAROLD MARSH SEWALL 
AND THE TRUCULENT PURSUIT 
OF EMPIRE: SAMOA, 1887-1890
B y  Pa u l  T. B u r l in
The conflict between Thomas F. Bayard, Grover Cleveland's first Sec­
retary of State, and his subordinate, Harold Marsh Sewall of Bath, 
Maine, who was U.S. consul general to Samoa, was not a disagree­
ment about the goals of American policy. Their disagreement related 
more to tactical considerations. And at that level, generational differ­
ences probably drove them apart. Specifically, the meaning of the 
Civil War for the younger generation of which Sewall was a part may 
well have contributed to his “truculent" pursuit of empire, a posture 
that totally unnerved the older Bayard. Paul T. Burlin is Associate 
Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History and 
Politics at the University of New England. He is currently working on 
a book that traces the nineteenth-century connections between 
Maine and the Pacific. He recently returned from Brazil where he 
taught U.S. history at the University of Sao Paulo as a Fulbright 
scholar. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the World Af­
fairs Council of Maine
J
u s t  one month from the time he was to leave office himself as a 
result o f Grover Cleveland's loss o f the 1888 presidential election, 
Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard dismissed Harold Marsh 
Sewall from his post as consul general to Apia, Samoa. Sewall, a member 
of a prominent Maine family, had taken the position at Apia with the 
conviction that America's prosperity depended on global trade connec­
tions, and these in turn depended on a strong diplomatic presence in 
crucial places like Samoa. His conviction, derived from his family's long 
history in shipbuilding and shipping, was consistent with the nation's 
growing involvement in global imperial politics in the second half o f the 
century. Thus his summary dismissal in 1889 is something of an enigma.1 
In fact, the dismissal climaxed a year o f conflict between the young con­
sular representative and the State Department. Exploring the sources of 
this tension sheds light on the crosscurrents of values and beliefs that
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shaped the American Empire during the late nineteenth century, includ­
ing the long shadow of the Civil War, which seemed constantly to be in 
Sewalls way.
Sewall was a native of Bath, a vibrant, seafaring city near the mouth 
of the Kennebec River. Born in i860, he grew up amidst the towering 
masts of the huge vessels built by his family’s famous shipyard— some of 
the largest square rigged sailing ships ever to carry the American flag. In 
such an environment, Sewall came to appreciate the importance of trade 
and commerce in maintaining the strength of the American Republic. 
If ships and the sea were one influence on the young Sewall, another was 
the Democratic party. Harold’s father, Arthur, was a prominent leader in 
the party, serving several times as a member of the Democratic 
National Committee. In 1896, he became William Jennings Bryan’s 
vice presidential running mate. Like his father, Harold Sewall was a 
Democrat.2
After graduating from Bath High School, Harold Sewall attended 
Harvard College and Law School. He was fortunate to graduate when 
Democrat Grover Cleveland was president, and through his father’s 
political influence, he was appointed vice consul at Liverpool, England, 
in 1885. His tenure at Liverpool was uneventful. Since the city was a 
major port of call for the Sewall ships, however, he spent a considerable 
amount of time facilitating family business. Very ambitious, Sewall 
aggressively sought a promotion, and he was appointed consul general 
to Apia, Samoa, in early 1887.3 Samoa was not a frequent port of call for 
Sewall ships. Nevertheless, the Pacific was familiar to the Sewalls, as the 
bulk of their tonnage was involved in deep-water voyages from San 
Francisco around Cape Horn to the East Coast o f the United States or to 
Europe. As the last decade of the nineteenth century approached, the 
Sewall vessels gravitated to the Hawaiian sugar trade, carrying the raw 
product to refineries in the United States.4
By the time of Sewall’s appointment to Apia, Americans and Euro­
peans had been in Samoa for approximately fifty years. In the late 1870s, 
with the United States taking the lead, each of the three major foreign 
powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, signed formal 
treaties with Samoa. The American treaty granted the United States the 
right to establish a coal yard at the typhoon-proof harbor at Pago Pago 
on Tutuila. Another article of the treaty provided that the United States 
would, if requested by Samoa, exercise its “good offices” were the islands 
threatened by a third power.5
While there had always been a certain uneasiness between the for-
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rign powers in Samoa, the situation deteriorated drastically in 1884, 
when Germany forced the Samoans to sign a new agreement which, if 
enforced, would have essentially placed the islands under its exclusive 
control. Thomas Bayard, Grover Cleveland s first Secretary of State 
(1885-1889), protested this move, but shortly thereafter, the Germans 
granted recognition to the rebel chieftain, Tuapa Tamasese, in defiance 
of the established king, Malietoa Laupepa, whom the United States sup­
ported. Acting on his own responsibility, U.S. Consul Berthold 
Greenebaum declared an American protectorate over the islands. Al­
though Bayard disavowed GreenebaunTs action, and ultimately replaced 
him with Sewall, the Secretary of State also called for a three-power con­
ference in Washington to resolve the troubled situation in Samoa.6
This was the situation when Sewall was appointed consul general. 
Before leaving for the South Pacific, he met with the Secretary of State. 
Their conversation did not bode well for the future. Bayard had heard 
that Sewall approved of GreenebaunTs action in raising the American 
flag over Samoa and cautioned that this “had created an unpleasant im­
pression in his mind.” Nevertheless, Bayard stated that Samoa was im­
portant to the United States, and he was opposed to any one power as­
suming paramount control over the islands.7 When Sewall left for 
Samoa, therefore, it was with the distinct impression that the adminis­
tration in Washington would resist any attempt by another country to 
assert exclusive control o f the island group. He traveled first to Hawaii 
and from there wrote to his father about rising British influence and the 
mediocre capabilities o f the American officials he met.8 He then pro­
ceeded to his post.
Unbeknownst to Sewall, the Washington Conference was not going 
well. It broke down over a major point of disagreement between the 
United States and Germany, concerning the form of the Samoan govern­
ment and the role o f the foreign powers in it. Germany and Great Britain 
favored a system whereby one nation, Germany, exercised mandatory 
authority in the islands. Bayard proposed a complicated arrangement 
with key responsibilities divided among the three powers in order that 
Germany not attain the upper hand. A few days after Sewall arrived in 
Apia, Bayard adjourned the conference for a few months to allow each 
nation to assess the stalemate.9
Sewall could not be kept informed about events in Washington on a 
timely basis because of the lack of a cable connection with Samoa. He 
arrived with the understanding that Bayard would protect American and 
Samoan interests at the conference and that the status quo would be re­
spected by all three treaty powers. A State Department communique in­
structed him to advise Malietoa to refrain from taking military action 
against Tamasese, since the political affairs of the islands were under dis­
cussion at Washington. Confident as a result of his earlier conversation 
with Bayard, he beseeched the king not to take military action against 
the German-backed faction lead by Tamasese.10 Sewall quickly con­
cluded, however, that the Germans were a very serious threat to Ameri­
can and Samoan interests. He wrote to Washington that “short as has 
been my time here, it has brought me in contact with that confidence on 
the part of the Germans in their early acquisition of these Islands.” " 
Having extracted a promise from Malietoa that he would not fight 
unless first attacked, Sewall watched the situation deteriorate. In mid- 
August, he reported that German warships were expected soon, and 
their presence would encourage the rebels. Sewall confided to his father 
his fears that Washington would “back out of Samoa,” and resolved that 
he would “ resign if the Germans are given these islands.” He added that 
he had “written much and plainly to Washington. I expect some of [the]
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In Samoa, the United States supported Malietoa Laupepa (left). Rebel chieftain 
Tuapa Tamasese (right) gained backing from the German government. Harold 
Sewall, who had extracted a promise from Malietoa to avoid open warfare, watched 
with alarm as the situation deteriorated.
Peabody-Essex Museum photo courtesy of the author.
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subordinates there will take offense. Try and find out.” 12 Shortly there­
after, Germany declared war on Malietoa and installed Tamasese as king. 
Sewall informed Washington that he had issued a non-recognition 
proclamation declaring his continued support for Malietoa. In addition, 
Sewall intervened in a number of ways against the Germans, some of 
which were covert. In a long letter to his fiancee in Maine, Sewall ex­
pressed his frustration with Washington. The State Department was 
simply not assertive enough with the Germans. Although he was con­
strained from declaring a protectorate, as Greenebaum had done, Sewall 
advised the king not to pay the fine the Germans demanded of him. 
With war declared, Malietoa in hiding, and German sentries posted 
throughout Apia and in the vicinity o f the American consulate, Sewall 
received a clandestine visit from the beleaguered king and some of his 
followers. Sewall advised the king to flee into the interior and to ignore 
the German demand to surrender.13
When the State Department received news of the declaration of war, 
Bayard sent a communique to Sewall reserving to the United States all 
rights in Samoa. The department had “received explicit assurances from 
Germany” that Samoan independence would not be impaired. The com­
munique also warned Sewall not to take sides in the dispute. Washington 
indicated approval of the non-recognition proclamation and congratu­
lated Sewall on his “dignified and discreet” conduct in very trying cir­
cumstances.14 From this point on, however, relations between Sewall and 
the State Department became progressively more strained.
It is clear from the letters to his fiancee and his father that Sewall did 
not believe the State Department was realistic in its assessment of Ger­
man motives in Samoa. Sewall continued to send urgent dispatches to 
Washington to make clear his perspective. While Germany might give 
assurances about respecting Samoan independence, its actions at Apia 
and elsewhere in the islands belied this. The political control exercised 
by Germany, Sewall felt, was only preliminary to the commercial su­
premacy which he believed was the Germans5 chief objective. Behind the 
German government's support o f Tamasese was the hand of a German 
commercial company, owner of the largest copra plantations in Samoa. 
Squeezed by British and American competitors, the company sought to 
eliminate its rivals through currency manipulation and monopoly over 
the copra supply. As Sewall pointed out, the Germans supplied arms to 
the Samoans, and since the islanders had little money, the Germans took 
mortgages on Samoan land and accepted payment exclusively in copra. 
Thus they threatened to tie up the entire copra crop, preventing Ameri­
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can trade with the islands.IS Sewall emphasized the great difference be­
tween Germany's official statements to Washington and the actual oc­
currences on the islands:
While war was declared against Malietoa personally it has been waged 
against the whole people, and although he gave himself up over seven 
weeks ago peace has not yet been announced to them. As for 
Samoan independence and neutrality it [sic] no longer exists. German 
sailors guard the flag o f Tamasese, and the German Commodore exer­
cises as effective a protectorate over this Islands as he could if Germany 
should openly extend one here.1*'
If this was not enough, the Tamasese government, at the behest of the 
Germans, began imposing new taxes on inhabitants of the islands. Be­
cause they lacked cash, Samoans either paid the taxes in copra or mort­
gaged their land to the German commercial enterprise.17
With his frustration clearly showing, Sewall penned a strong per­
sonal appeal to Bayard. He resolved, however, not to desert his post, “ for 
I am the only defense the Samoans have now." He would counsel against
With strong German backing and little resistance from the United States, Tamasese, 
shown here with some of his troops, was able to drive Malietoa from power. 
Secretary of State Bayard warned Sewall not to lake sides in the dispute.
Peabody-Essex Museum photo eourtesy of the author:
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From the consulate office in Samoa, Sewall sent fevered dispatches to Secretary 
ot State Bayard insisting on a more vigorous State Department posture.
Peabody-Essex Museum photo courtesy of the author.
opposing the Germans, but, as he informed his fiancee, “ I shall finally al­
low them to fight as the last resort for then they will be heard. The trou­
ble is that our people are ignorant of the history of our relations with 
these people. If they knew the truth they would feel as I do about it.” '1' 
Sewall was equally frank in his letter to the Secretary of State. Ac­
knowledging their previous conversation, he insisted that Malietoa had 
looked to the United States for sound and disinterested advice and had 
listened when Sewall advised him against taking up arms. At the time, 
according to Sewall, "the followers of Tamasese were depressed and dis­
organized, and the Germans feared the collapse of the insurrection be­
fore the arrival of their ships. Malietoa was eager for war, but at my 
earnest personal solicitation . . .  he promised me not to fight, and he kept 
his word, but with what sad results to himself and his people.” 19 The re­
sult was that Malietoa was in exile and his rival, Tamasese, was now king. 
In a revealing aside, Sewall pleaded: “ I am sure, Mr. Bayard, that if you 
could only understand the situation here, there would be little need of 
my appeal to you in behalf of these people.” Over the next few months, 
Sewall continued to send alarmed dispatches to the State Department.-’” 
In early January 1888, Sewall received a response. Bayard claimed to 
understand Sewall’s reaction to the “ ruthless aggression by Germany,”
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but he could not agree that Malietoa’s misfortunes stemmed from the 
trust he placed in the United States. From Bayard’s point o f view, the 
proximate cause of Malietoa’s trouble was an ill-advised effort to con­
clude an alliance with Hawaii. This had aroused German suspicions and 
emboldened Malietoa, who then behaved imprudently in his conflict 
with the rebel forces. He also noted that Sewall had received a confiden­
tial copy of the Washington Conference protocols; having read them, Se­
wall should have been aware of the secretary’s tenacious efforts to pro­
tect Samoan interests. Directing his ire at Sewall personally, the secretary 
asked: “By what reasoning you suppose my power to be able to encom­
pass these results: I am not informed.” German actions, Bayard indi­
cated, violated no international law insofar as the United States was con­
cerned, and to take up Sewall’s suggestion would constitute an act of 
belligerence. He reminded his subordinate that the Executive Branch of 
the United States government was not constitutionally empowered to 
declare war and concluded by observing that Sewall would best serve his 
country’s interests by exercising greater “self control.”21
Sewall responded in a dutiful, if somewhat qualified manner. Noting 
that he was disappointed “beyond measure” that the United States 
would not interfere directly with the Germans, he would bear Bayard’s 
words of caution in mind. However, he could not resist reasserting his 
point of view:
I have feared that impressions unfavorable to the Samoans might re­
sult from their ready submission to all that has been done against 
them. Should such impressions stand in the way of their receiving ei­
ther the sympathy or the help which they deserve, I beg to have it un­
derstood that the fault, if fault there is, is mine. Having kept them from 
fighting, when I believe [sic] this would have saved them from the sad 
lot which is theirs, I have sought to make what reparation I could by 
preserving peace, when war would only expose them to the terrible 
odds now against them. Should the time come when in the opinion of 
their friends they should act for themselves, there would be a rising of 
United Samoa.22
Needless to say, Bayard did not take this characterization of the situation 
as an opening for action. Therefore, throughout his remaining months 
in Samoa, Sewall continued to report on what he perceived as perfidious 
German activities. In another private letter to Bayard, he went so far as 
to call for the use of force to protect American land titles. Noting again 
that German policies were depriving Samoans of their land, he wrote:
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“Cannot something be done for the Samoans themselves to save them 
from such an exaction and from the loss of what little land is left to 
them?”23
Extremely frustrated, Sewall applied for leave and went to Washing­
ton in the fall of 1888. The existing record is sketchy, but it is clear that he 
attempted to influence policy on a number of different fronts. While 
guarded in his public statements, Sewall was blatantly and publicly un­
happy with current American policy. Hoping to influence policy in 
Samoa before the presidential election, he met with several political 
leaders, including George Handy Bates, who had been on a fact-finding 
mission to Samoa in 1886. As he told his father, he believed a stronger 
stand on Samoa would be helpful to the president in the election.24
After the November election, Sewall had an extended interview with 
Bayard, who indicated that American policy was to treat the Samoans 
humanely, to assist them with self-government, and above all to “neu­
tralize the waters o f Samoa for the peaceful commerce of the world ” 
Given these guidelines, “the unjust and even cruel treatment of the 
Samoans by the Germans” was not a “ causus belli for the United States.” 
Further, the State Department had never issued instructions that “war­
ranted [Sewall] in suggesting even that the United States were prepared 
to interfere by force for the protection of the Samoan King, or his prop­
erty or that o f his people against the action of Germany.” To Bayard, the 
question was whether the German government was doing anything that 
directly interfered with American rights, specifically the right to trade or 
conduct business with Samoa and rights at Pago Pago Harbor. Despite 
being well aware that the German copra company was behind the un­
rest, and that it had the tacit support o f the German government, the 
secretary did not waver in his conviction that the United States had no 
right to intervene. “We had no policy of annexation or protectorate 
whatever in Samoa or anywhere else outside of the United States.” 25
Soon after this meeting, Sewall decided to pursue a different tactic. 
By now, Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, had been elected president. 
Cleveland and Bayard were lame ducks. Sewall probably talked with 
William P. Frye, Republican senator from Maine, and a member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, because in December Frye called for a 
Senate investigation of American policy toward Samoa.26 As a result of 
this resolution, Sewall was called to testify before a subcommittee of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Frye, on three occa­
sions in January 1889. Sewall opened by pointing out Samoa’s strategic 
importance relative to American trade routes, indicating that the islands
would become all the more important with the completion of a canal 
through Central America. Alluding to his conversations with Bayard, Se- 
wall reasserted his claim that Germany should not assume control of 
Samoa. He drove home his point about passing bad advice to Malietoa 
when he dutifully restrained the king from fighting Tamasese’s forces by 
saying: “I could not in any way better have served the German purpose 
than by my mission that day.”27
It is clear from the testimony that the essence of Sewall’s disagree­
ment with the Cleveland administrations Samoan policy came down to 
one issue. From Sewalls perspective, Bayard was looking for excuses not 
to strike a more forceful posture. A case in point was the distinction Ba­
yard made between actions taken by the German government and ac­
tions taken by private German citizens. From SewalFs perspective, the 
distinction was specious. As he stated repeatedly, it was a generally rec­
ognized fact and a matter of some “notoriety” in the islands that the 
German government sought to undermine the neutrality and independ­
ence of Samoa, but worked through the subterfuge of its private citi­
zens.28
The young consul general could not countenance his superior’s 
cautious and legalistic approach. So long as Germany did not interfere 
with American treaty rights in Samoa, Bayard insisted, no basis existed 
on which to take action. The secretary repeated that advice to Cleveland 
at about the time of Sewall’s appearance on Capitol Hill. Even if Ger­
many were to annex Samoa, the United States could only demand full 
respect for treaty rights, something, he pointed out, Germany had al­
ways expressed an intention to honor.29 Sewall pursued a very different 
perspective: “ I think our interference, or a firmness on the part o f this 
Government. . .  is the only way to protect the interests we have secured 
through our treaty in Samoa.” Sewall’s testimony, coming in such con­
trast to the stated position of the Secretary of State, caused considerable 
stir. Although it was heard in executive session, and was apparently never 
published, much of its thrust was leaked to the press. In letters written to 
his parents, Sewall indicated satisfaction with his own performance: “ If 
Bayard demands my resignation he can have it, but this will only fan the 
flames, for the press and public and I believe the [sic] most o f our own 
people are with m e”30
The result, of course, was that Sewall was fired. Ironically, the new 
Republican administration appointed him a member of the American 
delegation to a conference in Berlin on Samoa, a belated extension of 
Bayard’s meeting in Washington in 1887. A further irony is that many ac­
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counts o f the Berlin Conference portray it as a culmination of 
Bayard’s policy, at least in its broad outlines.'1 Following the conference, 
Sewall went back to Samoa as consul general, where he remained until 
1892. His second tour of duty was much less eventful, although he did 
keep a suspicious eye trained on the foreign powers.
Following his resignation from the consular service in 1892, Sewall 
renounced his allegiance to the Democratic party, a move triggered by 
Cleveland’s withdrawal o f the Hawaiian annexation treaty submitted to 
Congress in the closing days of his predecessor’s administration. For Se­
wall the refusal to annex Hawaii was yet another demonstration of the 
Democratic party’s wrong-headed foreign policy. With his change in 
partisan loyalty, Harold Sewall actually campaigned against his father, 
the Democratic vice-presidential candidate running with William Jen­
nings Bryan, during the 1896 campaign.1’ With McKinley’s victory, the 
younger Sewall was appointed Minister to Hawaii. He remained in Hon­
olulu from 1897 to 1900. When he failed to win appointment as the terri­
tory’s new governor following annexation, Sewall returned home to 
Bath where he stayed active in state politics and public affairs for the rest 
of his life. Although Sewall sought other diplomatic opportunities after
Arthur Sewall, Harold’s father, 
was a prominent leader in the 
Democratic party, serving in 1896 
as William Jennings Bryan’s vice- 
presidential running mate. In 1892 
the younger Sewall renounced his 
allegiance to the Democratic 
party, and in 1896 he campaigned 
against his father.
Photo courtesy Maine Maritime 
Museum
returning to Maine, no significant appointments ever came his way 
again. Sewall died in 1924."
It is time to ask about the significance of this conflict. Were the dif­
ferences between Sewall and Bayard simply a result of Sewall’s character? 
Was the policy, as some argued at the time, a result of Sewall simply be­
ing too headstrong or impetuous? Or was it, as others claimed, just one 
more relatively meaningless partisan squabble?'4
Partisan political considerations were evidently important; Sewall 
believed that if Cleveland took a stronger stance on Samoa the president 
would enhance his chances for re-election. But after the election Sewall 
apparently became involved with Frye, a powerful Republican leader in 
Maine and Washington. This, of course, could be interpreted as oppor­
tunism— a young man angling for a new appointment with the Republi­
cans. But if that were the case, then Sewall sought a Republican appoint­
ment on the basis of a policy position he had staked out and argued 
consistently for almost two years. As to Sewall’s impetuosity, the Repub­
licans still sent him to the Berlin Conference and back to Samoa, and 
later McKinley sent him to Hawaii at a time when the president consid­
ered that appointment a key to securing the American presence in the 
Pacific." Nor did the disagreement involve fundamental foreign policy
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In iS.SH Sewall was dismissed from his post in Samoa by the outgoing Cleveland ad­
ministration, but he returned during the following Republican administration for a 
second tour of duty in Samoa, where he occupied this office.
Pen body-Essex Museum photo courtesy of the author.
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issues; Bayard, like Sewall, believed that the American presence in Samoa 
was important and should be protected. Bayard’s performance at the 
Washington Conference in summer 1887 suggests that he was a careful 
steward of American interests in Samoa.36 Furthermore, the long dis­
patch sent in 1888 to the American minister to Germany indicates that 
Bayard was neither duped nor acquiescent, as Sewall believed. The dis­
patch was written in response to accusations by Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck that the anti-German attitude and behavior of American con­
sular officials in Apia had caused the trouble in Samoa. After Sewall’s 
critical testimony before the Senate subcommittee, Bayard would come 
to feel differently about the consul general, but in 1888 he not only de­
fended Sewall but went on to charge Germany with the entire responsi­
bility for the problems in Samoa.37 Moreover, in the despatch Bayard 
painted with a broad brush, making no distinction between the motives 
of private German citizens and those operating in official capacity:
The conclusion at which I am forced to arrive from this review of re­
cent events in Samoa is that the present unfortunate situation there is 
due not to any action on the part of representatives of the United 
States, but to the fomentation by interested foreigners of native dissen­
sions, and to the desire exhibited in a marked degree by those in charge 
of local German interests to obtain personal and commercial advan­
tages and political supremacy.38
Bayard was under few illusions regarding German activity in Samoa. 
The Secretary of State was simply more cautious and prudent than was 
his younger subordinate. From Sewall’s perspective, the threat of force 
would have safeguarded both Samoan independence and American in­
terests, and his inability to articulate this point o f view in Washington 
was the root of his frustration. Sewall remained enthusiastic about the 
prospects for a showdown at Apia, even if it meant war.39
A deeper issue that separated Sewall and Bayard was the fact that the 
two men were of different generations. Although it may be common­
place to suggest that youth is imprudent while sage countenance comes 
with age, the age difference between Sewall and Bayard played out in 
precise historical terms. In early 1890, after the Berlin Conference but be­
fore returning to Samoa under Republican auspices, Sewall gave a 
speech at Bath high school. He spoke about Samoa and the “humilia­
tion” and “dishonor” the Germans inflicted on the American flag.40 He 
alluded to other recent international incidents involving foreigners 
treating the United States disrespectfully. Taking his moral inspiration 
from an earlier generation of “boys of Bath High School” who marched
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off to sacrifice in the Civil War, Sewall described “the greatest danger” 
facing the American people as a failfure] to maintain a firm and becom­
ing attitude towards other nations___We want in proper national pride.
Worthy of emulation is that spirit of military Europe, which everywhere 
unfurls the country’s flag and ever holds it high before the people. Wor­
thy of emulation is that spirit which fosters national sensitiveness and 
jealousy of national honor, which teaches the people to resent the slight­
est stain upon it as they would upon their own. Such a spirit we need 
among us today.41
From Sewall’s perspective, the American people lacked awareness of 
the need for “eternal vigilance” and the moral fiber that went with that 
vigilance. The country’s geographical isolation permitted the American 
people to devote themselves to the development of their riches. With 
this emphasis on domestic growth, however, there lurked a danger. He 
cautioned that “as in times of greatest prosperity, we are prone to forget 
the giver of all bounty, so now when the burden of government touches 
us so lightly, we are unmindful of what we owe it, and to our flag.”42 
Sewall’s speech exhibits a remarkable similarity to sentiments ex­
pressed by Theodore Roosevelt, a member of that same post-Civil War 
generation. Roosevelt believed in the edifying quality o f strenuous or 
heroic exertions and voiced his concern that the materialistic preoccu­
pations of his fellow citizens heralded a period of decline for the United 
States. Sewall lauded the moral qualities o f the Civil War that were ex­
hibited by the generation that fought it, as did Roosevelt, whose well 
known speech, “The Strenuous Life,” is a good example. Speaking during 
the aftermath of the Spanish American War, amidst the controversy sur­
rounding the acquisition of the new insular empire, the future president 
cautioned his audience to avoid the life o f “slothful ease” :
Let us, the children of the men who proved themselves equal to the 
mighty days, let us, the men who carried the great Civil War to a tri­
umphant conclusion, praise the God of our fathers that the ignoble 
counsels of peace were rejected; that the suffering and loss, the black­
ness of sorrow and despair, were unflinchingly faced, and the years of 
strife endured; for in the end the slave was freed, the Union restored, 
and the mighty American republic placed once more as a helmeted 
queen among nations.
We of this generation do not have to face a task such as that our fa­
thers faced, but we have our task, and woe to us if we fail to perform 
them! . . .  If we are to be a really great people, we must strive in good 
faith to play a great part in the world.43
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In 1892, at the height o f a diplomatic crisis with Chile, Sewall was ready 
to resign from the consular service and to join the army and the pending 
fray. Several years later, Roosevelt resigned his position as Assistant Sec­
retary of the Navy and went off to Cuba to fight. Sewall, who was then 
Minister to Hawaii, was clearly eager for war with Spain. He wrote to his 
cousin, a partner in the family shipping business, that he thought it 
would be extremely difficult for the American people to bring them­
selves to war, and hoped “that AS &  Co. have not joined the ‘peace at any 
price’ crowd. You will never feel right about it afterwards if you have.” He 
lamented his isolation from events and desired to be closer to the action, 
either militarily or diplomatically.4''
In 1894, the year Sewall switched political parties and began giving 
speeches on behalf o f the Republicans, Roosevelt wrote to his friend 
Henry Cabot Lodge, “ I thought Sewall’s [speech] more than good. It 
fired my blood to read it.”45 Sewall and Roosevelt had similar back­
grounds. Both were born into wealthy and influential families that took 
some interest in public affairs, and they attended Harvard College at 
about the same time.46 They were of a generation born just before the 
Civil War and grew up in a period dominated by that conflict. Sewall’s 
1890 speech, with the reference to the Bath boys marching off to battle, is 
a good example of that phenomenon. Sewall and Roosevelt grew up in 
the shadow o f that cataclysmic event, but neither had participated in it 
nor had to deal with the compelling issues that it raised. And that, of 
course, divided them from the political establishment o f Thomas 
Bayard’s generation.
It is impossible to argue that the stand one took on the foreign pol­
icy issues o f the day was simply attributable to age. Yet, there may be sug­
gestive patterns along these lines. Robert Beisner, for example, noted 
that the anti-imperialists o f the 1890s tended to be quite old. David Don­
ald argued that the generational experiences of those who fought for the 
Confederacy might provide important clues to the origins o f the Jim 
Crow Laws.47
A number of historical works have attempted to make the case that 
the Civil War had a significant impact on the intellectual climate and 
culture o f post-bellum society. Historians suggest that the patrician 
class, in particular, was profoundly affected. The glorification of the 
martial virtues and an accompanying disdain for the complacent mate­
rialism o f the Gilded Age seemed to have been a common reaction by 
members o f this group.48 Perhaps growing up as a member of the old 
elite without having participated in the conflict inclined one to a more
bellicose stance in foreign affairs. This attitude seemed morally equiva­
lent to the hard choices made by the previous generation which went off 
to fight.
Sewall looked for an opportunity to demonstrate the kind of 
courage, moral fiber, and sacrifice that he attributed to those who left 
Bath to fight in the Civil War. Almost a decade and a half after the speech 
he gave at his high school, Sewall still focused on the Civil War as the 
moral backdrop to the circumstances that faced the American people. 
Having apparently made a study of the Civil War regiments recruited 
from Maine, Sewall gave another speech in Bath on Memorial Day 1904, 
and said that it was both an honor and an embarrassment to address the 
dwindling ranks of Civil War veterans,
because no one of the generation to which I belong, no one of any gen­
eration since the war, can approach the drama of the stupendous 
struggle without an over-whelming sense of his own unworthiness.
And no one can try to lift its curtain, or describe the scenes behind it 
without a sense of temerity that tempts him to silence.49
He discussed the inspiring example of a Bath hero of the Civil War, Gen­
eral Thomas W. Hyde, who was only twenty when he recruited a regi­
ment and went off to fight, and who rose quickly through the ranks by 
virtue of his daring exploits. Clearly in awe of the valor demonstrated by 
Hyde, who received the Medal o f Honor for his role at Antietam, Sewall 
noted that the General had written a book in 1894 about the war.50 As 
Sewall went on to tell his listeners, Roosevelt had read the book and 
wrote to Hyde: “To think that we of this generation may never have a 
chance to prove ourselves worthy of the generation before us.”51 Sewall 
concluded his speech that day by commenting that “the danger is not in 
any extravagant eulogy of the soldier or o f war, or the flag or the strenu­
ous life, but rather that in these comfortable times we may exalt too 
much the fruits of peace and forget those who have made these possi­
ble.”52
It seems clear that for some members of the post-Civil War genera­
tion the moral example of the great American cataclysm was a recurrent 
issue. The Civil War challenged individuals such as Sewall and Roosevelt 
by providing a poignant example of moral choice and self-sacrifice that 
stood in contrast with the complacency around them. The unworthiness 
that Sewall mentioned in the later speech was born from not having 
been tested in a dramatic way. Perhaps the fear of not passing the test,
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were it to come along, provoked a truculent demeanor when the country 
appeared challenged from abroad. It would seem, then, that personal or 
psychological factors relating to the post-Civil War generation need fur­
ther exploration in the ongoing debate regarding the evolution of the 
American empire in the late nineteenth century.53
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